Proportionality and Freedom -- An Essay on Method in Constitutional Law by Perju, Vlad F.
1Forthcoming, Journal of Global Constitutionalism, Volume 1 (2), 2012 (Cambridge UP)
PROPORTIONALITY AND FREEDOM
-AN ESSAY ON METHOD IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -
Vlad Perju∗
§ 1. Introduction 
The advent of proportionality in constitutional adjudication is one of the most significant 
developments in contemporary law. Proportionality has become the “universal criterion 
of constitutionality.”1  Its spread around the world has led scholars to describe it as the 
“most successful legal transplant of the twentieth century.”2  However, this success 
remains confounding. Proportionality’s empowerment of judges seems to bring it into 
tension with ideals of democratic rule. Furthermore, the protection this method affords to 
constitutional rights is not automatic, but conditional upon contextual assessment by 
courts that rights are sufficiently strong to override conflicting public or private interests. 
In the proportionality  machinery, rights become mere considerations in the process of 
judicial reasoning – which is, admittedly, “not much.”3 
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1 David Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law 162 (2004). 
2  Mattias Kumm, Constitutional Rights as Principles: On the Structure and Domain of Constitutional 
Justice, 2 International Journal of Constitutional Law (I-CON) 574, 595 (2003).
3 Mattias Kumm, Id. at 582. (“Having a right does not confer much on the rights holder: that is to say, the 
fact that he or she has a prima facie right does not imply a position that entitles him/her to prevail over 
countervailing considerations of policy.”).
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 Nevertheless, ours is the “era of proportionality.”4  From countries in Eastern 
Europe to South Africa and from Canada to Brazil to Europe’s supranational courts, 
judges have adopted proportionality as their method of choice in constitutional cases and 
beyond. This global spread of proportionality has been extensively documented.5  From 
its origins in nineteenth century  Prussian administrative law and transition to the 
constitutional domain after World War II, at first in Germany  and gradually far beyond, 
this method has colonized the imagination of constitutional jurists around the world. With 
the exception of American law6, the centrality of proportionality  in constitutional 
adjudication has made this method “a foundational element of global constitutionalism.”7 
             However, the explanation of proportionality’s success remains elusive. The range 
of available accounts spans the entire spectrum from cold realism to an idealism of sorts. 
From a realist perspective, judges favor proportionality because it hides the exercise of 
judicial discretion more credibly or effectively  than alternative methods, such as 
categorical reasoning or balancing. By giving a formal structure to the weighing of 
conflicting interests, proportionality  offers the illusion that values can be aligned along 
one scale despite their incommensurability. However, such accounts leave much 
unanswered. Tracing the success of proportionality solely to this cover-up function is a 
jurisprudential shortcut to a likely dead-end. The painstaking process of proportionality-
4 Aharon Barak, Proportionality and Principled Balancing, in Law & Ethics of Human Rights, vol. 4 (1):
1-18, 14. 
5 See, e.g., Alec Stone Sweet and Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, 47 
Columbia Journal Transnational Law 72, 160 (2008); Aharon Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights 
and their Limitations (forthcoming, 2012). 
6  For a study of proportionality in the context of American law generally, see E. Thomas Sullivan and 
Richard S. Frase, Proportionality Principles in American Law (2008); Jed Matthews and Alec Stone Sweet, 
All Things in Proportion? American Rights Review and the Problem of Balancing, 60 Emory Law Journal 
797 (2011) and Moshe Cohen-Eliya & Iddo Porat, The Hidden Foreign Law Debate in Heller: The 
Proportionality Approach in American Constitutional Law, 46 San Diego Law Review 367 (2009). 
7 Id. (Alec Stone Sweet and Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism),  at 160. 
The authors base this conclusion on the observation that “(b)y the end of the 1990s, virtually every 
effective system of constitutional justice in the world, with the partial exception of the United States, had 
embraced the main tenets of proportionality analysis.” (id., at 74). 
3structured judicial reasoning cannot be a priori dismissed as merely  a sham. By  contrast, 
idealist accounts zero in on that reasoning process and emphasize its inherent rationality.8 
As we will see, these accounts of proportionality tend to overlook significant 
shortcomings in its judicial technique. But even if they did not, many idealist accounts 
only justify  the advent of proportionality, without explaining its appeal. Quite apart from 
a healthy dose of skepticism about the promise of pure (legal) reason in the aftermath of 
the mass murders and catastrophes of the twentieth century, rationality alone cannot fully 
reveal this method’s appeal to complex institutional actors such as courts. 
 My aim in this paper is to provide an additional perspective on the rise of 
proportionality as a constitutional method. I argue that, more than alternative methods, 
proportionality helps judges mitigate what Robert Cover called the “inherent difficulty 
presented by  the violence of the state’s law acting upon the free interpretative process.”9 
In addition to routine deployment of its force-dispensing machinery, forcing citizens “to 
be free”10, the institutions of the constitutional democratic state must also justify the 
direction of that deployment. Law’s violence is thus twofold. One coercive dimension 
takes the form of the actions or inactions that the state imposes on its subjects. But a 
second, and related, dimension of violence stems from the process of justifying those 
coercive effects. As we will see, that justification represents the state’s rejection of the 
outcome of the losing party’s jurisgenerative interpretative processes. I suggest that 
proportionality appeals to judges because of their need for adequate methods to mitigate 
8  See ,e.g., Moshe Cohen-Eliya and Iddo Porat, Proportionality and the Culture of Justification, 59 
American Journal of Comparative Law 463 (2011); Mattias Kumm, The Idea of Socratic Contestation and 
the Right to Justification: The Point of Rights-Based Proportionality Review, Law and Ethics of Human 
Rights vol. 4(2): 141-157 (2010). 
9  Robert Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harvard Law Review 4, 48 (1983). Since the state is often 
involved as a party in constitutional conflict seeking court permission to override individual rights, Cover’s 
mention of “state law” is best understood as referring to the “law of the state.” My emphasis on 
interpretation here tracks Cover’s, insofar as it is an emphasis on constitutional (as a form of legal) 
interpretation. For an argument about law’s “homicidal potential”, by contrast - or, perhaps, in relation to - 
its jurispathic dimension, see Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 Yale Law Journal 1601 (1986). 
10 The formulation is Rousseau’s. See Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, Book I, §  7 (1726). 
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the violence that their justification of state coercion inflicts on private (non-official11) 
jurisgenerative interpretative processes in constitutional cases.12 
 Left unmitigated, this second dimension of law’s violence can undermine the duty 
of responsiveness that courts owe to litigants qua citizens. In contrast to totalitarian 
regimes, whose institutions do not react to – or, even worse, retaliate against – the 
demands of their subjects, the public institutions of a constitutional democracy  have a 
duty to respond to the claims of the citizenry  in ways that recognize and reinforce the 
social standing of each citizen claimant as free and equal.13 In the case of legal disputes, 
responsiveness cannot always require the substantive satisfaction of all the claimants. But 
it does require that  the process of justifying outcomes meet certain conditions. For 
instance, it  requires that the justification treat with respect and dignity  all the claimants, 
including those whose claims are inevitably  unsuccessful.14  Proportionality, I submit, 
answers these demands better than alternative methods. 
 At first glance it might seem counterintuitive that judicial responsiveness should 
depend on how successfully courts mitigate the violence they inflict on the parties’ 
jurisgenerative processes. For one, litigants routinely set themselves up for 
disappointment by exaggerating the strength of their claims. One’s distorted view of the 
strength of his or her claim heightens the perception of violence inflicted by  a court’s 
11  “Private” should not be interpreted as “individual” but as “non-official.” It includes the government’s 
constitutional interpretation seeking protection of its state interests.  
12   I should note that Cover’s own substantive views about the possibility of justification is far more 
skeptical than the position presented in this article. For more on this difference, see below at note 17.
13  See, for example, Thomas Pogge, Politics as Usual 200 (Polity,  2010) (“defining feature of democracy 
“the moral imperative that political institutions should maximize and equalize citizens’ ability to shape the 
social context in which they live.”).  
14  I discuss the duty of responsiveness in Vlad Perju, Cosmopolitanism and Constitutional Self-
Government, International Journal of Constitutional Law I-CON, vol. 8(3): 236 (2010). For now I should 
only mention that I don’t understand “responsiveness” as a purely procedural value. For such an approach, 
see the analysis in Frank Michelman, Must Constitutional Democracy be 'Responsive'?, 107 Ethics 706 
(1997) (reviewing and analyzing the procedural conception of democratic responsiveness in Robert Post’s 
Constitutional Domains).
5failure to endorse it, with the result of placing an unreasonably high bar for judicial 
responsiveness. Moreover, even when the expectations are not overblown, the mere 
imperative of not leaving cases undecided opens a wide gap between the perceptions of 
the parties – whether private individuals or the state15 – ex ante and ex post the judicial 
decision. At least in hard cases, claims of ostensibly comparable strength are presented as 
the outcomes of the parties’ jurisgenerative interpretative processes that aspire to official 
endorsement by courts as the institutions mandated to settle disputes over constitutional 
meaning. Yet there is a striking discontinuity between the perceived strength of the 
parties’ claims, understood as their reasonable constitutional interpretations and assessed 
ex ante the judicial decision, and the effects on the parties of binary statements of 
constitutional validity, as experienced by them ex post the decision. Binary statements of 
legal validity (valid/invalid, legal/illegal) erase all traces of the chance for success that 
the losing claim had before the judicial decision was delivered.16  The binary  effects of 
statements of validity heighten the violence on the parties’ free interpretative processes 
by which legal controversies come to an end. As a constitutive feature of a constitutional 
system, it  seems that perceived judicial unresponsiveness cannot be a source of law’s 
violence. 
 Or can it? It helps to recall that violence is a matter of degree. While some level 
of violence in law seems unavoidable17, judicial methodology structures the process of 
justification and thus calibrates the degree of violence. The two sources of law’s violence 
- outcome and justification of outcome - are related. As Charles Tilly concluded in his 
15 For an argument about how constitutional rights become interests by entering the decisional calculus, see 
Richard Fallon, Individual Rights and the Powers of Government, 27 Ga. L. Rev. 343 (1993). 
16 As Habermas put it, “norms of action appear with a binary validity claim and are either valid or invalid; 
we can respond to normative sentences, as we can to assertoric sentences, only by taking a yes or no 
position or by withholding judgment”, Habermas, Between Facts and Norms 255 (1996). See also Ronald 
Dworkin,  A Matter of Principle 119-120 (1985) (discussing the bivalence thesis that applies to law, as to all 
dispositive concepts.)
17 There are limits inherent in the process of justification. Robert Cover refers to them as tragic limits in the 
common meaning that can be achieved in justifying the social organization of legal violence. See Robert 
Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 Yale Law Journal 1601, 1628-1629 (1986). 
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sociological study of reason-giving, “whatever else happens in the giving of reasons, 
givers and receivers are negotiating definitions of their equality or inequality.”18 
Proportionality  stands out by how it positions  judges vis-à-vis the parties and the parties 
in relation to one another. This is the proper context for understanding the common 
defense of proportionality as a method that “shows equal respect  and concern for 
everyone concerned.”19Proportionality mitigates the gap between the positions of the 
parties ex ante and ex post the judicial decision, because it treats with due consideration 
and respect the public interest pursued by the state as well as the individual interests of 
the right-holder. 
 My explanation of the success of proportionality is functional, not causal. The 
worldwide spread of proportionality is a complex phenomenon whose causes span from 
the historical to the sociological.20 By contrast, my account makes no claim about how 
proportionality comes into existence, but it does aim to explain its staying power and 
success.21 I identify  a function that proportionality plays in contemporary  constitutional 
law and practice - namely, helping judges mitigate the violent effect of their decisions on 
the claimants’ jurisgenerative processes –, together with an account of what in 
contemporary  law might explain why such a function is perceived as necessary (the fact 
of social pluralism, judges’ angst over law’s under-determined nature, the complexity of 
18 Charles Tilly, Why?, at 24-25 (footnotes omitted).   
19  David Beatty, Ultimate Rule of Law, at 169.  Kumm argues that proportionality marks the shift from 
interpretation to justification: “the proportionality test merely provides a structure for the demonstrable 
justification of an act in terms of reasons that are appropriate in a liberal democracy. Or to put it another 
way: it provides a structure for the justification of an act in terms of public reason”, in Mattias Kumm, The 
Idea of Socratic Contestation and the Right to Justification: The Point of Rights-Based Proportionality 
Review, Law and Ethics of Human Rights vol.  4(2): 141-157 (2010), at 150.  However, it is important to 
incorporate in a theory of proportionality the perspective of the right-holder himself. From that perspective, 
proportionality remains a method of interpretation. As I argue in Sections Three and Four, a virtue of 
proportionality is that it can integrate both perspectives.
20  For a discussion of available explanations, see Moshe Cohen-Eliya and Iddo Porat, supra note 8
(Proportionality and the Culture of Justification), at 467-474.
21 On functional explanations, see G.A. Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History, 249-277 (1978).
7the relations between state and individual). This argument supplements, without replacing 
historical, sociological or other compatible normative explanations.
This broad approach to proportionality teaches as much about contemporary 
constitutional thought as it does about the method itself. Rather than analyzing this 
method as a stand-alone legal tool, I take a broader view, one that integrates 
proportionality within a larger configuration of patterns of constitutional doctrine and 
discourse. I refer to such configurations as “constitutional styles.” A style encapsulates in 
its methodology a comprehensive approach to constitutional rights, the role of courts and 
their duties of responsiveness, and generally to the substance of law’s shaping impact on 
the “culture of liberty”22  in a constitutional democracy. Different styles are often 
intertwined in practice, but my description here treats them as ideal-types. Proportionality 
epitomizes a particular style. Since each style can be differentiated by its peculiar 
approach to the positioning of different constitutional actors – that is, to the construction 
of constitutional space – I use an architectural metaphor to label it  the Corinthian style.23 
This constitutional style, like the Greek architectural order itself, has an integrative aim 
that combines elements of two other constitutional styles. The first is the Doric 
constitutional style, which is characterized by  a top-down form of legal reasoning and a 
categorical method of constitutional interpretation of deontological rights. The second is 
the Ionic constitutional style that relies on a contextualized bottom-up form of reasoning 
and a balancing judicial methodology. 
  The first two sections describe the Doric and Ionic styles, respectively. A 
description is necessary  because the Corinthian style, to which I turn in Section Three, 
integrates their respective approaches through the proportionality method. Proportionality 
places a non-deontological conception of rights within a categorical structure of formal 
analysis. It represents a synthesis of Doric fidelity to form and institutional structure 
22 I borrow this phrase from Ronald Dworkin, A Bill of Rights for Britain (1990).  
23 For a discussion of the different orders of Greek and Roman architecture, see Fil Hearn, Ideas that Shape 
Buildings 97-133 (MIT Press, 2003). 
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(thesis) with Ionic “fact-sensitivity”24  to contexts in which specific controversies arise 
(antithesis) that gives the perception of enhanced judicial responsiveness. However, one 
should not conflate the issue of perception and that of substantive worth. I argue in this 
section that while proportionality  is comparatively more responsive than alternative 
methods, its judicial technique has not entirely lived up to its integrative aims. 
Proportionality  succumbs to pressures from the centrifugal forces of universalism and 
particularism that it seeks to integrate. These pressures give rise to a paradox in that the 
back-loading of proportionality analysis (the fact that, in practice, most government al 
measures survive the first stages of the analysis), is both its flaw and the source of its 
appeal. It is its flaw because such back-loading raises the stakes at the later (balancing) 
stages of proportionality analysis by increasing the need for principled decision-making 
techniques. Such formalizing techniques are no more available here than they are under 
the Ionic style. But the escalating stakes are also a source of proportionality’s appeal 
because they have the effect of validating both competing interests. As far as the state 
interest is concerned, the more stages of proportionality  analysis the challenged 
regulation survives, the stronger the recognition of the underlying public interest 
becomes. On the right-holder’s side, the demanding scrutiny of the state interest seeking 
to override the right reinforces the weight that the constitution places on the interest 
protected by the right. However counterintuitively, the judicial vindication of the strength 
of both conflicting interests narrows the ex ante/ex post gap to a considerable extent, thus 
enhancing the perception of judicial responsiveness. 
In Section Four I take up the objection that judicial violence on private 
jurisgenerative interpretative processes is jurisprudentially irrelevant. The discussion 
progresses from constitutional methodology to the broader impact of the fact of social 
pluralism on constitutional adjudication in late modern democracies. Pluralism opens 
“abysses of remoteness”25, as Hannah Arendt calls them, that challenge the fundamentals 
24 Philip Sales and Ben Hooper, Proportionality and the Form of Law, 119 Law Quarterly Review vol. 119 
(2003), at 428. 
25 Hannah Arendt, Understanding and Politics, in Essays in Understanding 1930-1954, (Jerome Kohn, ed.) 
(1994) at 323.
9of the interaction between citizens and their institutions. Pluralism widens the pool of 
perspectives on social and political life from which claims are drawn while, at the same 
time, deepening the need for justification of specific institutional responses in ways 
acceptable to a pluralist citizenry. I argue that the fact  of pluralism, together with the 
critique of legal determinacy and the changing role of the state, lengthens the distance 
between claimants, widens the ex ante/ex post gap, and heightens the need for 
mechanisms of institutional responsiveness to mitigate the violence that the law of the 
state inflicts on private jurisgenerative interpretative processes.  
Michael Walzer described the challenge of judging not as “that of detachment, but 
of ambiguous connection.”26  The last  section analyzes the role of the imagination in how 
modern law constructs the ambiguous connection between judges and their audiences. 
Using the works of Kant and Arendt, I analyze the role imagination plays in how different 
constitutional styles construct the positional objectivity of decision-makers. 
Proportionality  synthesizes the forces of universalism and particularism and relies on the 
role of imagination in ways that other constitutional styles have traditionally  sought to 
avoid. In conclusion, I will argue that the relation between proportionality and freedom is 
complex, and identify some dangers and opportunities in the age of proportionality.  
§2. The Doric Constitutional Style 
Reasoning categorically on down from text or high principle, at the “emancipatory core” 
of the Doric style is the idea that constitutional – like all subspecies of legal – judgment 
should resist “subsumption under particularistic causes.”27 Such causes erode the virtues 
of generality, universalism, and legal form. In this view, succumbing to particularistic 
causes corrupts the commitment to the rule of law and undermines the responsiveness of 
the constitutional system to the demands of litigants qua citizens. Since constitutional 
judges decide cases “by virtue of their authority, and not because they are any more likely 
26 Michael Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism 37 (1987).
27 Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations 503-504 (2004). 
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to be right than other people,”28 judicial power is usurped whenever judges are perceived 
to deliver all-things-considered decisions. 
           The Doric style builds walls – the “sworn enemy of caprice, ... the palladium of 
liberty”29  – to fragment the constitutional space into separate spheres of authority and 
discredit “Olympian”30 standpoints. Constitutional rights are walls that carve out  absolute 
spaces of decision-making authority.31  The corresponding method of interpretation is 
categorical analysis. A claim that a right has been violated requires an “assessment of the 
state’s justifications for action in light of the principles that defined the legitimate basis 
for state action in the particular sphere in question.”32 That assessment is jurisdictional, 
so to speak, rather than substantive. For instance, burning a flag or criticizing the 
government’s energy policy are actions which the constitutional right to free speech 
shields from governmental intrusion, no matter how strong or even cogent the 
government’s reasons for interference might be. Rights are grounds for dismissing as 
28 Charles Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the Supreme Court's Balancing Test, 76 
Harvard Law Review 755, 761(1963). 
29 “Form is the sworn enemy of caprice,  the twin sister of liberty… Fixed forms are the school of discipline 
and order, and thereby of liberty itself. They are the bulwark against external attacks, since they will only 
break, not bend, and where a people has truly understood the service of freedom, it has also instinctively 
discovered the value of form and has felt intuitively that in its forms it did not possess and hold to 
something purely external, but to the palladium of its liberty.” (Rudolf von Jhering, quoted in Roscoe 
Pound,  The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines, 27 Harvard Law Review 195, 208-209 
(1913).
30 Charles Fried, supra note 28 (Two Concepts of Interests), id.
31 There are a number of ways in which the constitutional spaces are carved out, and here I focus on just 
one approach. See Stephen Gardbaum, A Democratic Defense of Constitutional Balancing, 4 Law & Ethics 
of Human Rights 78 (2010). 
32  Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in Constitutional Law, 45 
Hastings L. J. 711, 713 (1994).
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irrelevant – not as weak or otherwise defective – claims to the satisfaction of collective 
goals that conflict with the right-holder’s interests.33
 According to the Doric style, responsiveness is owed to the allocational scheme 
and, through it, to the right-holder. This form of system-centered responsiveness is best 
understood through an institutional lens. The preservation of social order under 
conditions of pluralism requires constant reinforcement of the equal status of claimants 
and the stabilization of their expectations. Since rights protect the actions of right-holders 
within pre-designated spheres of authority, their judicial enforcement is not tantamount to 
endorsing the wisdom of their holders’ substantive choices. Rather, in enforcing 
individual rights, courts (re)enforce an institutional scheme that allocates to the right-
holder the authority  to act and decide as he thinks best.34 Does the constitution place the 
authority to decide whether to terminate an unwanted pregnancy  with the woman and her 
doctor or with the state?35  Does it leave it to the right-holder or to the state to decide if 
loaded handguns can be kept at home in urban areas with high crime rates?36 As a further 
example, consider whether terminally ill patients have a constitutional right to 
experimental drugs. 37 That question is not about the wisdom of the choice to take such a 
risk (i.e., whether or not it  is wise or reasonable to put oneself at  a heightened risk from 
insufficiently  tested and thus potentially unsafe drugs). Rather, the question is to whom 
33 This is the idea of exclusionary reasons. See Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms 35-49 (1975). See 
also Jeremy Waldron, Pildes on Dworkin's Theory of Rights,  Journal of Legal Studies, 2000,  vol. 29 (1): 
301, 301 (“Rights are limits on the kinds of reasons that the state can appropriately invoke in order to 
justify its actions”). See also Pildes, supra note 32 (Avoiding Balancing), at 712.   
34  Howe, Foreword: Political Theory and the Nature of Liberty, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 91,91 (1953) 
(“Government must recognize that it is not the sole possessor of sovereignty, and that private groups within 
the community are entitled to lead their own free lives and exercise within the area of their competence an 
authority so effective as to justify labeling it a sovereign immunity.”)  
35 For this interpretation of the early abortion cases, see Laurence Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269 (1975). 
36 District of Columbia v. Heller 554 U.S. 570 (2008)
37  See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Experimental Drugs v. Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 
2007), cert. denied mem., 128 S.Ct. 1069 (2008).
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(the patient, the doctor, the state, etc.) does the constitution allocate the authority to make 
the decision that the risk is or is not worth taking. 
Of course, this approach allows for great variety of approaches - historical, moral 
etc. - in answering such allocational questions. Moreover, that scheme itself may reflect 
substantive judgments.38  But stipulating as rights the outcomes of those substantive 
judgments marks an epistemological break: a particular liberty  interest is protected not 
because it is important, but rather because the constitution says so. As one scholar put it, 
“a litigant’s reference to freedom of speech or conscience is not simply a claim for 
immediate satisfaction, but is the assertion of an interest which can be understood only as 
a reference to systemic ways of doing things, to roles, institutions and practices.”39 In this 
world, each wall “creates a new liberty.”40 The advantage of this framing of constitutional 
questions is not that  disagreement will fade away – it won’t – but rather that  such framing 
allows for a better grasp of what  the disagreement is about. 
The Doric conception of rights has a deontological character that basic goods 
lack.41 Rights are not like iPads or designer clothes or any other consumer good we might 
wish to own but have no special entitlement to demand. Rather, as Ronald Dworkin put 
it, “if someone has a right to something, then it is wrong for the government to deny it to 
him even though it  would be in the general interest to do so.”42 Rights have a strong anti-
utilitarian animus.43 Jeremy Waldron captures this well: 
38 The scheme can be “the very product of [substantive] interest-balancing.”128 S. Ct. 2783 at 2821 (Scalia, 
J.) 
39 Charles Fried, supra note 28 (Two Concepts of Interests),  at 769. The right to free speech is a second-
order reason about how the constitution allocates decision-making power within the spheres of authority 
that it carves out.
40  Michael Walzer,  Liberalism and the Art of Separation, Political Theory vol.  12 (3): 315-330 (1984), at 
315. Walzer continues: “The art of separation is not an illusory or fantastic enterprise; it is a morally and 
politically necessary adaptation to the complexities of modern life.  Liberal theory reflects and reinforces a 
long-term process of social differentiation.”
41 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, at 257. 
42 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, at 269. 
43 Id. (Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously), at 277.
13
“the resolution of any conflict with considerations of utility is obvious: rights are to 
prevail over utility precisely because the whole point of setting them up is to 
correct for the defects in the utilitarian arguments which are likely to oppose them. 
We do not  stare at  the utility calculus and then stare at the rights, and discover that 
the second is sufficiently important to ‘trump’ the importance of the first. Instead, 
our sense of the internal connection between the two established the order of 
priorities.”44 
From this perspective, cracking the deontological shell that encases the 
constitutional rights, for instance by open balancing, compromises the structure of 
constitutional liberty. Such a procedure reopens the constitutional space to the kind of 
substantive negotiation that rights are supposed authoritatively to bring to an end. The 
stakes of revisiting the allocation of decision-making authority between actors of 
asymmetrical power – the state and the individual – are so high that the constitutional 
space should not be malleable: constitutional experimentation of this type is discouraged. 
The Doric space is simply not open to contestation in that way.
It is, however, open to contestation in other ways. Understanding rights as 
structural devices for the fragmentation of political authority should not obscure that the 
Doric culture of liberty is nevertheless a culture of argument.45 For one, rights themselves 
are not absolute. They  can be overridden, presumably  so long as limitations remain 
exceptional.46  The Doric style uses a twofold strategy  to mitigate the impact of rights 
limitations. First, it requires a narrow definition of rights. This is unsurprising: defining 
44 Jeremy Waldron, Rights in Conflict, Ethics vol. 99 (1989): 503-519, at 516.
45 Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations,  supra note 27, at 502 (“To put it simply and, I fear, 
through a banality it may not deserve, the message is that there must be limits to the exercise of power, that 
those who are in positions of strength must be accountable and that those who are weak must be heard and 
protected, and that when professional men and women engage in an argument about what is lawful and 
what is not, they are engaged in a politics that imagines the possibility of a community overriding particular 
alliances and preferences and allowing a meaningful distinction between lawful constraint and the 
application of naked power.”)
46  For a discussion,  see generally Stephen Gardbaum, Limiting Constitutional Rights, 54 UCLA Law 
Review 785 (2007) (discussing “internal limits” on rights).
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broadly  rights that are understood deontologically will increase exponentially the number 
of instances when government policies violate constitutional rights. Such an approach 
would expand the constitutional domain and make courts the sole negotiators of state’s 
role in society. The second strategy  of the Doric style is to structure the typical 
constitutional conflict as between individuals and the state.  In situations when 
constitutional norms do not apply  horizontally, conflicts of individual rights that could 
challenge the deontological conception will be infrequent. Assessing the success of this 
double strategy  depends largely  on how one defines success. If one takes a participant’s 
perspective, the mere possibility that rights can be limited, however exceptionally, is 
sufficient to enable the interested party – typically the state – to argue that the case at 
hand warrants precisely such an exception.47 
As should be apparent by now, the Doric style denies the constitutional relevance 
of the ex ante/ex post gap. In this view, there is only one legal standpoint and that  is the 
standpoint of the constitutional allocation of decision-making authority. Judges are the 
guardians of that scheme. Constitutional responsiveness means respect for the 
allocational scheme and the underlying values or principles. Doric responsiveness 
requires that the judicial mind never becomes unmoored, for fear that, if set sail, it might 
drift away from the perspective of the allocation of decision-making power and toward 
the forbidden space of “particularistic causes.”48 
§3. The Ionic Constitutional Style 
47 At the same time, as the example of the American constitutional culture shows, the constant reaffirmation 
through public discourse of the deontological conception of rights in a Doric culture of liberty can be a 
successful self-fulfilling prophecy. For a critical discussion of the broader cultural implications of this 
deontological approach to rights in the US context, see Mary-Ann Glendon,  Rights Talk: The 
Impoverishment of Political Discourse (1991). 
48 Koskeniemmi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, supra note 27, at 501 (“formalism seeks to persuade the 
protagonists (lawyers, decisionmakers) to take a momentary distance from their preferences and to enter a 
terrain where these preferences should be justified, instead of taken for granted, by reference to standards 
that are independent from their particular positions or interests.”).
15
The Ionic style develops as an alternative to the detached immutability of the judicial 
standpoint in the Doric approach. Specifically, it is an alternative to the “impartial reason 
[that] aims to adopt a point of view outside concrete situations of action, a transcendental 
‘view from nowhere’ that carries the perspective, attitudes, character, and interests of no 
particular subject or set of subjects.”49 In this view, the attempt to move beyond “current 
human choices”50  breeds estrangement and alienation. The cold aloofness of Doric 
judicial reason can ignore context only by detaching from social life itself. From this 
perspective, the quest to resist the pressures of particularistic causes misunderstands the 
challenge of modern law. That challenge is not how to artificially  detach constitutional 
reason from an unruly  social life. Rather, it is how to face that complexity full-on and 
overcome, though law, “the frictions of distance”51 that separate us. 
The Ionic alternative to detachment is situatedness. Situated decision-making 
rejects “the notion that there is a universal, rational foundation for legal judgment. Judges 
do not ... inhabit a lofty perspective that yields an objective vision of the case and its 
correct disposition.”52  Situatedness does not require that the judge be situated 
somewhere, anywhere – that would be trite – but rather that he be situated in the 
(particularist) context of the case. As Judith Resnik put it in her study of feminist 
adjudication, “adjudication is one instance of government deployment of power that has 
the potential for genuine contextualism, for taking seriously the needs of the individuals 
affected by  decisions and shaping decisions accordingly. Precisely because adjudication 
is socially embedded, it can be fluid and responsive.”53  Responsiveness here is 
49 Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference 100 (1990).  
50 Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover,  96 Yale Law Journal 1860, 1877 (“legal 
positivism or objectivity that implies an authoritative basis or foundation beyond current human choices.”). 
See also Minow, Martha L. & Elizabeth Spelman. "In Context," 63 Southern California Law Review 1597 
(1990).
51 David Harvey, Cosmopolitanism and the Geographies of Freedom 140 (2009).
52 Catharine Wells, Situated Decision making, 63 Southern California Law Review 1727, 1728 (1990).
53 Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our Judges,  61 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 1877, 1935 (1988). The Ionic architectural order itself was associated with the feminine gender. See 
Fil Hearn,  supra note 23 (Ideas that Shape Buildings), at 110.  
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conceptualized as respect for the rich and multilayered social meanings of the participants 
in the constitutional process. A contextual, pragmatic, bottom-up approach leads 
constitutional analysis to reflect on the richness of the life that law aims to regulate. If the 
Doric divides social space into absolute spheres of authority, the Ionic constitutional 
space is relative; the landscape changes with the perspective of each stakeholder.54
Under this view, rights are not spaces of exclusion; fellow citizens and the state 
are not presumed to be intruders. Dieter Grimm made the point that “ the function of the 
constitutional guarantees of rights is not to make limitations as difficult  as possible but to 
require special justifications for limitations that make them compatible with the general 
principles of individual autonomy and dignity.”55  By contrast to the deontological 
approach to rights, the Ionic style routinely  authorizes judges to break the shell encasing 
the right in order to access the background interests. Rights are understood as claims to 
institutional protection for select substantive needs, and not as ambits delimiting spheres 
of sovereignty. For instance, speech and privacy are super-valued interests that the 
pouvouir constituant selects and for whose protection and/or realization the state 
summons its coercive force.56 
By contrast to the Doric style, which focuses on the delimitation of the sphere of 
constitutional authority and interprets rights narrowly, the Ionic approach interprets rights 
broadly  and then channels the superior quantum of the judge’s interpretative energy to the 
question of whether their override is justified. For instance, when asked to decide 
whether there is a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide, a judge first 
recognizes the privacy  interest in these situations and then proceeds to consider whether 
54  Catharine Wells, supra note 52 (Situated Decision-making), at 1734 (“Understanding a controversy … 
requires that it be experienced from several different perspectives as a developing drama that moves 
towards its own unique resolution.”).  
55 See Dieter Grimm, Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional Jurisprudence,  57 University 
of Toronto Law Journal 384, 391 (2007). 
56  The legal recognition of interests is of course not unidirectional. Some interests do not preexist legal 
norms; they are, rather, a consequence of their creation. The expectation that a benefit-granting statutory 
scheme will not be discontinued absent change in circumstances may give rise to interests that cannot 
logically precede the adoption of that scheme. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
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the government has sufficiently good reasons to limit  its exercise. The broad 
interpretation of rights has a cumulative effect on the legal system. Because public 
policies will more often interfere with broadly defined rights, the frequency with which 
public interest overrides individual rights will correspondingly increase, lest  the 
government should be brought to a halt. This structure of the constitutional doctrines 
accordingly  shapes the Ionic culture of liberty. In this culture, rights are not separating 
walls of a deontological cast. 
So, what exactly  are rights? Can they be more than “just rhetorical flourish?”57 
Since breaking the deontological shell turns rights-claims into substantive reasons for 
demanding a particular institutional response, it  seems that “having a right does not 
confer much on the rights holder.”58  The existence of a privacy interest  protected by a 
right does not eo ipso entitle the right holder to rely  on the state’s protection of his 
privacy interests. If that protection is granted, it will be as the outcome of a balancing 
process wherein judges deem that privacy interest comparatively stronger than conflicting 
interests.59  
And so begins, in the view of its critics, the out-of-control process of judicial 
empowerment. After surveying more than three decades of German constitutional 
jurisprudence, David Currie concluded that “[a] balancing test is no more protective of 
liberty than the judges who administer it.”60  However strong, rights as substantive 
57  David Beatty, supra note 1 (Ultimate Rule of Law), at 171 (“When rights are factored into an analysis 
organized around the principle of proportionality, they have no special force as trumps. They are just 
rhetorical flourish.”). 
58  Mattias Kumm, supra note 2 (Constitutional Rights as Principles),  at 582. (“Having a right does not 
confer much on the rights holder: that is to say, the fact that he or she has a prima facie right does not imply 
a position that entitles him/her to prevail over countervailing considerations of policy.”). 
59  The outcome of balancing can be stated in the form of a legal rule.  See Robert Alexy, Theory of 
Constitutional Rights 56 (2002) (“the result of every correct balancing of constitutional rights can be 
formulated in terms of a derivative constitutional rights norm in the form of a rule under which the case can 
be subsumed.”).
60 David P. Currie, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany 181 (1994). 
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reasons are mere “reasons that can be displaced by other reasons.”61  Critics have 
dismissed the law-ness of this approach: “A constitutional guarantee subject to future 
judges’ assessments of its usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at all.”62
The critics get one point but miss another. Yes, this style empowers courts to 
override rights in specific contexts. But judges do so in a culture of argument that 
requires them to justify their decisions. While it may be disquieting to realize that the 
satisfaction of rights-protected interests depends on further judicial recognition, the fact is 
that no constitutional style – the Doric style included – can get around this problem, if a 
problem it is, once it is acknowledged that either public or private interests may  override 
constitutional rights. To paraphrase a classic, the contemporary jurist  who feels uneasy 
about leaving law to the “mercy” of argument was born in the wrong century. In our late 
modern age, the terms of collective self-government are the object of argument and 
debate.63
Rather than mourn the lost age of certainties, we would be better served to study 
just how different styles construe constitutional inquiry. This is where Ionic balancing 
comes up  short because it fails to adequately  structure the process of weighing conflicting 
interests. The lack of formal structure is meant to facilitate the judge’s immersion into the 
61 Robert Alexy,  supra note 59 (Theory of Constitutional Rights), at 57. It is of course possible to devise 
categorical protections within the model of rights as substantive reasons. As Kumm reminds us, certain 
types of reasons – say, religious reasons for introducing prayer in public schools – are categorically 
excluded from the comparative weighting of interests in proportionality analysis.  See Mattias Kumm, supra 
note 2 (Constitutional Rights as Principles), at 591.
62 Scalia, J., in Heller 128 S. Ct. at 2821. 
63 Rights can also alter the time-horizon in which that process unfolds. For instance, rights can be part of 
the ongoing interaction between the right-holder and social institutions over time. Martha Minow writes: 
“A claimant asserts a right and thereby secures the attention of the community through the procedures the 
community has designated for hearing such claims. The legal authority responds, and though this response 
is temporary and of limited scope, it provides the occasion for the next claim. Legal rights, then, should be 
understood as the language of a continuing process rather than the fixed rules. Rights discourse reaches 
temporary resting points from which new claims can be made. Rights, in this sense, are not “trumps” but 
the language we use to try to persuade others to let us win this round”. See Martha Minow, supra note 50 
(Interpreting Rights), at 1875-1876 (footnotes omitted).
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particular contexts of the parties.64  Context-based analysis requires flexibility, which 
means there can be “no purely  logical or conceptual answer”65 to the question of how to 
prioritize conflicting interests. At one level, the constant resurfacing of background 
interests in the balancing analysis is a welcome reminder of what makes them worth 
protecting as rights.66  However, leaving the judicial weighing of conflicting interests 
completely unscripted undermines the methodic dimension of balancing. Because there is 
no method to follow, parties can expect  from judges only the outcome of the process – 
and that outcome it bound to be unpredictable. Balancing opens up the constitutional 
space and then simply leaves it  open. But a constitutional method must do more. It must 
be administrable in a way that makes it responsive to the requirements of the institutional 
structure and the legitimate expectations of future claimants. Further, it must 
operationalize, again in an administrable fashion, the weight and pedigree of the right-
holder’s interests that enter the balancing analysis. Granted, those interests do not 
automatically trump  state interests. But then again, nothing happens “automatically” in a 
culture of argument. 
Somewhere along the way the Ionic insight about the importance of context 
becomes a trap. The point of rights was the transcend context, yet it turns out that rights 
depend on context. That is the insight. But the demise of the deontological conception of 
rights also erodes the protected space that rights were supposed to create, whose 
enforcement depends in part on the interpreters’ awareness of the role of rights in the 
64 Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our Judges,  61 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 1877, 1935 (1988) (“Rather than bemoan...a switch in roles, feminism teaches us to celebrate such 
rearrangements,  to require judges to let others judge them. Such moments might better enable judges to be 
empathetic, to adopt the perspective of the other, to enter into the experience of the courtroom unprotected 
by their special status. Judge as witness can thus be understood as a profound challenge to a stable 
hierarchy, as a subversive act to be applauded.”). 
65 128 S. Ct. at 2850 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
66 Contrasting balancing to rule-based categorical reasoning, Kathleen Sullivan has defended balancing on 
precisely this ground: “rules lose vitality unless their reason for existing is reiterated”, in Kathleen Sullivan, 
Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing, 63 University of Colorado Law Review 
293, 309 (1992) (footnotes omitted). 
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general constitutional scheme. It is a mistake to downplay that effect. The Ionic 
correction of Doric detachment from context and reliance on legal form swings too far in 
the opposite direction. The challenge becomes not how to chose between these two styles, 
but rather how to synthesize them. 
§4. The Corinthian Constitutional Style
Like the Corinthian architectural order itself, which combines Doric and Ionic elements, 
this constitutional style integrates fidelity to legal form and institutional structure with 
versatile “fact-sensitivity”67  to the contexts in which controversies arise. This style aims 
to adjust the Ionic correction of the Doric style just enough to enhance judicial 
responsiveness to actual context and fulfill the demand of systemic predictability  and 
administrability that are associated with the rule of law in complex democracies. The 
proportionality method epitomizes this integrative ethos. The method frames a non-
deontological conception of rights within a categorical structure of formal analysis. 
Proportionality  analysis consists of one preliminary step, where courts ask about the 
purpose of challenged regulation, followed by three “proper” steps: suitability, necessity, 
and (Ionic-type) balancing where courts weigh the gain from satisfaction of the goal 
against the loss that  results from the intrusion on the constitutional right.68 Limitations on 
rights that fail any  one of these steps are invalidated as violations of constitutional rights. 
Measures that survive the proportionality  test are allowed to override constitutional 
rights. 
  The previous sections have identified two approaches to the ex ante/ex post gap. I 
have argued that the Doric style does not perceive the gap as a problem; the Ionic 
approach does perceive it as such but lacks the resources to address it. The Corinthian 
67 Philip Sales and Ben Hooper, Proportionality and the Form of Law, 119 Law Quarterly Review vol. 119 
(2003), at 428
68  I use here Alexy’s standard “balancing” formula: “[t]he greater the degree of non-satisfaction of, or 
detriment to, one right or principle, the greater must be the importance of satisfying the other.” In Robert 
Alexy, supra note 59 (Theory of Constitutional Rights), at 102.
21
constitutional style seeks a more satisfactory approach. The key is its integration within 
the judicial standpoint itself of what Hannah Arendt called, in the context of judgment in 
general, the “plurality of diverging public standpoints.”69 Rather than assign judges to an 
immutable standpoint “above the melee”70  or immerse them into the standpoint of each 
participant, the Corinthian style gives them a method – the proportionality method – to 
transcend by  integrating the perspectives of the parties. The plurality  of those 
perspectives, and its relevance for constitutional judgment, is neither denied, as in the 
Doric style, nor extolled, as in the Ionic, but simply  acknowledged as a fact of social life. 
Proportionality  guides the judge to move back and forth between his position and that of 
the claimants, thus enlarging the judicial standpoint by integrating different perspectives. 
This constitutional space is neither absolute nor relative, but relational. 71
 The next sections reconstruct the “positional objectivity”72  of the judicial 
standpoint in proportionality  analysis. For now I am interested in the details of this 
method’s structure and application. I have thus far provided an account of this method’s 
aims, in their best light. However, attention to detail reveals a disconnect between its 
integrative aims and judicial technique. Proportionality  aims to integrate universalism 
and particularism. In that task it ultimately  fails because it succumbs to the centrifugal 
pressures exerted by these two poles. Put differently, the success of proportionality can be 
traced to the perception of enhanced judicial responsiveness, yet, as will see below, that 
perception itself is not fully  supported by constitutional practice. Precisely  because of this 
disconnect between reality and perception, a phenomenological approach to 
69 Lisa Jane Disch, Hannah Arendt and the Limits of Philosophy 162 (1994). 
70 Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy 42 (1989).  
71  I borrow this classification (absolute,  relative, relational spaces) from David Harvey,  Cosmopolitanism 
and the Geographies of Freedom (2009), although I should point out that my use does not completely track 
Harvey’s. For more on relational space, see Lefebvre, The Production of Space (1992). 
72 This phrase is Amartya Sen’s. Sen argues for conception of objectivity that is positional-dependent and 
person-independent. Observations and beliefs are objective if any subject could reproduce them when 
placed in a position similar to that of the initial observer.  The challenge then becomes how to define the 
position-dependent.  See Amartya Sen, Positional Objectivity, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 22 (2) 
126-145 (1993).
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proportionality can be illuminating. For instance, only an inquiry into that perception 
itself can help  to understand the distinction between proportionality  and balancing. A 
purely  analytical or conceptual different would fail to identify differences, as they both 
rely  on a similar approach to rights.73 Nevertheless, judges who apply  the proportionality 
method adamantly deny that balancing and proportionality are two names for the same 
method. The perception that proportionality  is a method apart needs to be studied in both 
its doctrinal and theoretical roots. We begin with doctrine. 
 Consider the tensions deriving from the formalization of the different steps of 
proportionality analysis. The distinctiveness of these steps aims to enhance the 
administrability and legal certainty of the proportionality  method in contrast to the more 
ill-structured balancing process. Concerned with applications of proportionality that  blur 
the line between the “necessity” and the balancing stages of the test, Dieter Grimm has 
warned that “a confusion of the steps creates the danger that elements enter the operation 
in an uncontrolled manner and render the result more arbitrary and less predictable.”74 
Arbitrary  and unpredictable is how critics describe balancing. The formalization of the 
different steps is supposed to placate these worries.75
           But formalization replicates the tensions between the Doric and the Ionic styles. 
Consider, for instance, the analysis of legislative purposes at the preliminary stage. 
Judges’ demand that legislators present the legislative purpose is an significant challenge 
to the legislative prerogative. It signifies that the pedigree of a statute enacted by the 
people’s elected representatives is insufficient ground for upholding its validity; further 
justification is necessary. This demand introduces a Doric element into the Corinthian 
style: the idea that  rights protect a space which the government may not enter when 
pursuing impermissible goals. In theory, the purpose analysis can be quite demanding 
since courts can impose requirements about the level of specificity at which the purpose 
73 See Stephen Gardbaum, supra note 46 (Limiting Rights). 
74 Dieter Grimm, Supra note 55 (Proportionality in Germany and Canada), at 397.
75  The idea is also to avoid the twin risk of what the South African Constitutional Court called the 
“mechanical adherence to a sequential check-list,” S. Manamela, 2000 (3) SA 1 (CC), at 20 (cited in 
Stephen Gardbaum, supra note 46 (Limiting Rights), at 841. 
23
must be formulated, as well require evidence that the stated purpose of legislation is the 
actual purpose, rather than an ex post facto rationalization.76 
 In the practice of proportionality, however, legislation is virtually never 
invalidated at this early stage. It turns out, unsurprisingly, that it is always possible to 
come up with some permissible goal for the challenged statute. Courts can strike down 
legislation at this stage only by pushing back, and that has not  been a strategy of choice 
for courts applying proportionality analysis. Judges have preferred to defer to the 
legislature on separation of powers grounds: the democratically elected branch has the 
right to set its policy agenda.77  To be sure, structural deferral does not make the 
preliminary stage meaningless. Even without close judicial scrutiny of legislative goals, 
the stated goals will shape the lines of argument available at later stages. However, asking 
for legislative reasons but failing to question their soundness is no doubt an odd 
combination.78 It is a combination that veils the unease of courts keen to be perceived as 
actors responsive to the overall constitutional structure. 
76 For an example of such analysis in American constitutional law, see United States v.  Virginia,  518 U.S. 
515 (1996).
77  See Dieter Grimm, supra note 55(Proportionality), at 388. Canadian courts initially tried to impose a 
higher threshold on the government by asking that the governmental objective be “pressing and 
substantial” (Aharon Barak, Proportional Effect: The Israeli Experience, 57 U. Toronto L.J. 369, 371 (2007) 
concern or “sufficiently important to justify overriding a Charter [constitutionally protected] right” See 
Barak, Proportional Effect,  at 371 (quoting PETER HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA, student ed. 
(2005) at 823. Over time however, as the other steps in the analysis have become more substantial, even 
Canadian courts have begun to defer more and more to the legislature. See generally Sujit Choudhry, So 
What Is the Real Legacy of Oakes?, (2006) 34 Sup.Ct.L. Rev. (2d) 501).
78 Some advocates of proportionality – including judges writing extra-judicially – have argued for a more 
incisive judicial involvement at this stage. President Barak has expressed doubts about the wisdom of 
deferring to the legislator. See Aharon Barak, supra note 77 (Proportional Effect),  at 371 (“Despite the 
centrality of the object component,  no statute in Israel has been annulled merely because of the lack of a 
proper object [or purpose]. A similar approach exists in German constitutional law … This is regrettable. 
The object component should be given an independent and central role in examining constitutionality, 
without linking it solely with the means for realizing it. Indeed, not every object is proper from the 
constitutional perspective. This is not the expression of a lack of confidence in the legislature; rather it is 
the expression of the status of human rights.”) (footnotes omitted). 
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Structural deference at the preliminary step sets in motion a sliding scale toward 
the later stages of analysis which threatens to collapse proportionality into unstructured 
balancing. The back-loading of proportionality  analysis inevitably puts heightened 
pressure on the balancing stage. The greater the deference of courts at the first stages of 
proportionality analysis, the more the substance of their review is pushed back to the 
latter stage. Paradoxically, herein lies both proportionality’s great flaw and the source of 
its irresistible appeal. On the one hand, the escalating stakes require a judicial technique 
for principled balancing. As we will see, it is questionable if such a technique is available. 
On the other hand, the ever-greater stakes legitimize the strengths of the competing 
interests. As far as the state interest is concerned, the more stages of proportionality 
analysis the challenged regulation survives, the stronger becomes the recognition of the 
underlying public interest becomes. On the right-holder’s side, this analytical structure 
ensures that demanding scrutiny  awaits any attempts to override the individual interest, 
given its importance under the overall constitutional scheme. However counter-
intuitively, this judicial vindication is the source of responsiveness, understood as due 
consideration, that bridges the ex ante/ex post gap and mitigates the violent dimension of 
judicial decision. 
At the balancing stage of proportionality analysis, judges break the institutional 
shell that encases the right and engage in a comparative Ionic-like weighing of the 
seriousness of the infringement of the right against the degree of satisfaction to the 
interests protected by the challenged statute. Formalizing techniques are necessary in 
order to show that judicial analysis at this stage is not “free-style” moving in and out of 
form. I discuss below the formalizing technique of distinguishing between the core and 
periphery of rights and find it unconvincing. I conclude that the appeal of proportionality 
should be sought elsewhere. 
The distinction between the core and the periphery of rights is a widely  used 
formalizing technique. Its aim is to confine tradeoffs in the balancing process to the 
periphery of rights. As former President of the Israeli Supreme Court Aharon Barak put it, 
judges “must aim to preserve the ‘core’ of each … libert[y] so that any damage will only 
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affect the shell.”79  Once an interest has been identified at the core of a right – for 
instance, the interest in self-defense at the core of the Second Amendment right  to bear 
arms or the interest in political speech within the broader freedom of expression – that 
interest must not be balanced away.
The centrifugal jurisprudential forces that structure proportionality analysis are 
apparent. By contrast to the deontological conception of rights, this conception authorizes 
judicial access to the underlying interests. The assumption is that  a state measure – or 
conflicting individual right, as the case may  be – affects only  some interests protected by 
the right.80  However, those interests are prioritized. The corresponding gradation of 
degrees of difficulty matching the hierarchy of protected interests reflects the centrality of 
legal form. Assuming a vertical constitutional conflict, the state will find it more difficult, 
perhaps almost impossible, to justify  overriding the core of a constitutional right. The 
more onerous the justification becomes on that scale of difficulty, the closer to categorical 
the protection that the core of the right receives. This is how the Corinthian style 
integrates a Doric dimension within a non-deontological, Ionic conception of rights. 
There are, however, difficulties. Not all rights have clear cores. For instance, 
disability  rights, which which in many  jurisdictions have constitutional stature, are said 
not to have cores.81  The delimitation of cores is also a matter of dispute, as the 
79 See Shavit v. The Chevra Kadisha of Rishon Le Zion, C.A. 6024/97 (1999) (Supreme Court of Israel),  at 
§ 9. 
80  The assumption, as Dieter Grimm put it, is that: “It is rarely the case that a legal measure affects a 
fundamental right altogether. Usually, only a certain aspect of a right is affected…The same is true for the 
good in whose interest the right is restricted. Rarely is one measure apt to give full protection to a certain 
good.” Dieter Grimm, supra note 55 (Proportionality), at 396.
81  Samuel Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability”, 86 VA. L.  REV. 397, 406 (2000) (arguing 
that disability rights do not have a “core”). 
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interpretation of freedom of religion shows.82   Critics have pointed out that  it is often 
impossible to identify  the core of a right without reference to competing public interests.83 
The delineation will depend upon which methodology the interpreter uses, and how the 
methodology is used in the given case. For instance, in the U.S. Supreme Court debate in 
District of Columbia v. Heller showed, the distance between the majority’s originalist 
analysis and the dissenters’ proportionality  method was much shorter than either side 
acknowledged. In that case, the dissenting justices used historical analysis to distinguish 
core and periphery (or central and ancillary  purposes) of the Second Amendment right to 
bear arms and found the challenged regulation constitutional because it affected only  the 
ancillary interest in individual self-defense, rather than the interest in partaking in a 
militia that was at the core of the constitutionally-protected right.84  The central 
disagreement between the majority and the dissent was about the correct historical 
interpretation. These difficulties have led some courts, such as the South African 
82 In the context of freedom of religion, if judges may break the institutional shell of a right,  then they may 
look for the “core” of the free exercise right in the beating heart of the belief and practice of a religious 
experience, but this is a notoriously sticky enterprise. “It is no more appropriate for judges to determine the 
‘centrality’ of religious beliefs before applying a ‘compelling interest’ test in the free exercise field, than it 
would be for them to determine the ‘importance’ of ideas before applying the ‘compelling interest’ test in 
the free speech field.” Employment Division,  Dep’t of Human Resources v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1988). 
See also Shavit v. The Chevra Kadisha of Rishon Le Zion, C.A. 6024/97 (1999) (Supreme Court of Israel) 
(Judge Englard) (deciding whether Jewish burial societies, which customarily administered cemeteries 
throughout the country, had the right to prevent family members from inscribing on the deceased’s 
tombstone her birth and death dates according to the standard Gregorian calendar (as well as the Hebrew 
calendar).
83 For these reasons, the distinction between core and periphery raises more questions than it answers. See 
also, Julian Rivers, Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review, Cambridge Law Journal vol.  65 (1): 
174-207 (“The problem with the ‘very essence’ of a right is that it is almost impossible to define it usefully 
without reference to competing public interests.”), at 187. 
84 554 U.S. 570 (2008).   
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Constitutional Court, to stop relying on this technique at the balancing stage of 
proportionality analysis.85 
A more comprehensive study would be required to present the definitive case that 
judicial technique does not live up to proportionality’s integrative aims. But even a partial 
account should suffice to establish that technique alone cannot adequately explain the 
success of proportionality. The next section looks at that success in a broader 
jurisprudential perspective. 
§5. Constitutional Method in 3-D
Constitutional conflict is not only a conflict of interpretation, though this is the best 
normative reconstruction of the form that  conflict takes before courts. Each party brings a 
claim as to why, in its interpretation, the constitution extends its protection in the given 
context to a specific interest. The role of courts is thus to create law as much as it is to 
suppress it. After mentioning the “inherent difficulty presented by the violence of the 
state’s law acting upon the free interpretative process,” Cover continues: “It  is remarkable 
that in myth and history the origin of and the justification for a court is rarely understood 
to be the need for law. Rather, it is understood to be the need to suppress law, to choose 
between two or more laws, to impose upon laws a hierarchy. It is the multiplicity  of laws, 
the fecundity  of the jurisgenerative principle, that creates the problem to which the court 
and the state are the solution.” 86  
According to the liberal sensibility, a solution is needed for fear that, when left 
untamed, the fecundity of the jurisgenerative process can endanger the social order. 
85  To be specific, the constitutional provision in the South African Interim Constitution followed the 
essentialist paradigm of the German style.  The Court’s discussion of its shortcomings can be found in S. v. 
Makwanyane, (1995) (3) SALR 391 (CC), para. 132 (The difficulty of interpretation arises from the 
uncertainty as to what the ‘essential content’ of a right is, and how it is to be determined. Should this be 
determined subjectively from the point of view of the individual affected by the invasion of the right, or 
objectively, from the point of view of the nature of the right and its place in the constitutional order, or 
possibly in some other way?”).
86 Robert Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harvard Law Review, 4, 48 (1983).
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While not all jurisgenerative processes are interpretative in nature, specific concerns 
about interpretation processes go as far back as Hobbes. As he argued, if individuals are 
left to their own lights to interpret the demands of the law – be that the law of nature or, 
by modern analogy, any form of higher law such as a written constitution – they  will 
come up, for a variety of reasons not all of which include self-interest, with diverging 
interpretations.87  Those interpretations make coordination impossible, which in turn 
spells disaster. To enable coordination, individuals can be said to entrust to the state and 
its institutions the final authority  to interpret the law.88  Judicial interpretation therefore 
supersedes private interpretation – that is, interpretation anchored in the citizens’ legal 
imaginaries89 –, just as the law of the state trumps private law-making more generally. 
State law by necessity  crushes private jurisgenerative processes and that inevitably 
disappoints the hopes that the future losing party had ex ante the judicial outcome. Why, 
then, is the violence that  courts inflict  on the private laws or legal interpretation a 
problem? 
 To see why, let us first note that an account of the nature of political authority 
explains precisely that – the nature of political authority. Yet not all the questions about 
power and public life concern the nature of political authority. As Bernard Williams 
pointed out, there are questions about politics that are not first-order questions about its 
foundations.90 This simple point is relevant to our purposes. The issue of the nature of 
judicial authority is conceptually  distinct  from that of the effects of judicial decisions, 
which itself is distinct from how adjudicators reach those decisions. An account of the 
87 Hobbes, The Leviathan (Richard Tuck, ed.) (1996). 
88  The Supreme Court delivers final statements of legal validity. The common reference is to Justice 
Jackson’s statement: “We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are 
final”, Brown v. Allen 344 US 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson J.,  concurring). See Larry Alexander and Frederick 
Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation,110 Harv. L. Rev. 1359 (1997).
89 I use the idea of “legal imaginary” by analogy with Charles Taylor’s conception of the social imaginary, 
in Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (2007). Taylor defined the social imaginary as “a largely 
unstructured and inarticulate understanding of our whole situation... (,) an implicit map of the social 
space.” (at 25)
90 Bernard Williams, In the Beginning Was the Deed (2005).  
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foundations of political or constitutional authority is not, without (much) more, also an 
account of constitutional methodology. While it is true that a theory  of the foundations 
offers a lens for assessing methodological approaches, even that perspective is just one 
among many.
 An alternative is the perspective from reality. The starting point here is not the 
foundation of political authority but a fact of social life or legal practice, such as the rise 
of proportionality as method of constitutional analysis around the world. This success can 
be understood as one indication that courts perceive as insufficient – or, as I have 
suggested, insufficiently responsive – to justify violence by reference solely to the need 
for an allocational constitutional scheme that gives judges the final word over what the 
law is. The reasons why invoking the allocational scheme is insufficient have as much to 
do with the perception of that  violence as with the allocational scheme itself. The 
invocation of the allocational scheme is seldom appropriately “thin”, in other words, it is 
often difficult  to resist the attraction of using the existence of the allocational scheme to 
support conclusions in specific cases without the need to further defend one’s 
interpretative choices. A combination of factors explains why such conclusions are 
unsupported. Consider first the fact  of social pluralism. Pluralism makes it  significantly 
more difficult to justify exercises of political power that coerce subjects into compliance 
with norms which they, as individuals holding diverging life plans, can – and often do – 
reasonably challenge on substantive grounds of fairness as they understand it. The fact of 
pluralism puts particular pressure on judicial responsiveness. It widens the pool of 
perspectives on social and political life from which claims are drawn while at the same 
time deepening the need for justification of specific institutional responses in ways 
acceptable to a pluralist citizenry. How can the free institutions of a constitutional 
democracy  retain an appropriately high degree of responsiveness to the claims of a 
citizenry that holds deep, reasonable, yet incompatible comprehensive doctrines of the 
good?
 Add to this the critique of legal determinacy  in modern jurisprudence. Drawing 
inspiration from the mid-twentieth century philosophy of language, jurists have identified 
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open-texture as a phenomenon central to law’s medium, language.91  This is especially 
relevant in the case of open-ended constitutional provisions where it is assumed that there 
will be a multiplicity of interpretative options, some rooted in conflicting, and sometimes 
irreconcilable, political and ideological visions of society. This critique of determinacy 
has heightened the perception of fallibility  of legal justification and has recast the rights 
discourse in a different light.92  Recent calls for transparency and candor must be 
understood in this context, as attempts to compensate the inescapable need for legal 
interpretation through the virtues of the process of interpretation or the ethics of the legal 
interpreters.93 
 Another reason why reference to the constitutional scheme is insufficient has to 
do with the complexity  of the relations between individuals and the modern state. The 
role and functions of the modern state have expanded in the course of the twentieth 
century and the dynamic of the relationship between its institutions and citizens has 
become accordingly complex. As far as the law’s task is concerned, this complexity can 
cut both ways. Law’s role can be to counterbalance that complexity and preserving the 
polyphonic simplicity  of the Doric style: constitutional rights are insuperable side-
constraints on the satisfaction of state interests.94  Or, conversely, the state’s functions 
might require its law to reflect the intricate dynamic of the relations between the state and 
its citizens. This approach, encapsulated by the Corinthian style, sees law as lacking real 
ground on which to pretend that conflicts between the state (that is, us) and the individual 
right-holders are any  less complex than we know them to be. While much can be said for 
both approaches, the spread of proportionality shows that constitutional practice has 
taken the latter route.  
91 See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd ed., 1997), Ch IV. 
 92 For a critical discussion, see Lawrence Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 
54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 462 (1987). See also Mark Tushnet, Essay on Rights, 62 Texas Law Review 1363 
(1984).
93 See Vicki Jackson, Being Proportional about Proportionality, 21 Constitutional Commentary 803 (2004).
94 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia 10 (1977).  
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 The question remains why proportionality has been perceived as more attuned to 
the need to justify interpretative violence and judicial coercion. I have already suggested 
that part of the answer has to do with respect. In hard cases, where the indeterminacy of 
the interpretative choice makes it both harder and more urgent to mitigate the ex ante/ex 
post gap, proportionality enhances judicial responsiveness by enabling judges to show 
“equal concern and respect for everyone involved.”95  As Alec Stone Sweet and Jed 
Mathews note, this method makes clear that “a priori, the court holds each of the 
(parties’) interests in equally  high esteem... [and] provides ample occasion for the court to 
express its respect, even reverence, for the relative positions of each of the parties,” 
enabling the court to “credibly claim that it shares some of the loser’s distress in the 
outcome.”96 
 The attention it gives to the claims before it, its substantive engagement and the 
respect with which it treats them – all of these validate the claims and make 
proportionality a respectful and thus responsive method. Proportionality aims to place the 
impartiality of the judicial standpoint without denying the objectivity – tantamount in this 
context to the strength – of the claimant’s positions. As David Beatty  put it, “Because it  is 
able to evaluate the intensity of people’s subjective preferences objectively, 
[proportionality] can guarantee more freedom and equality than any rival theory has been 
able to provide.”97  As we have seen, the back-loading of proportionality  analysis 
escalates the stakes by heightening the need for a method that will allow judges to 
measure and ultimately decide which of the conflicting interests will be allowed to 
prevail. As far as the state interest is concerned, proportionality  treats legislation with all 
the deference possible in a system of assertive judicial review. Judges do not reject out of 
hand the public interest as understood by the people’s elected representatives. Rather, 
they  put it through a series of steps and are deferential to it up to and including the point 
95 David Beatty, supra note 1 (Ultimate Rule of Law), at 169. 
96 Alec Stone Sweet and Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, 47 Colum. 
J. Transnat’l L. 72,  88, 89 (2008). The authors see this feature as part of proportionality’s strategic 
dimension. 
97 See David Beatty, supra note 1 (The Ultimate Rule of Law), at 172. 
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when a decision needs to be made. The more stages of the analysis a claim survives, the 
more its legitimacy is confirmed and the stronger it  becomes. By the same token, this 
method reaffirms the importance of the right-holder’s interest by  ensuring that only 
important public interests will override the very high level of legal protection given to the 
individual’s rights. Of course, deciding remains inescapable. It would be unreasonable for 
the members of pluralist societies to imagine they  can go through life without having to 
compromise with the other free and equal members of their communities. As Arendt put 
it, we share the world with men, not man.98 But against  the horizon of that necessary act 
of coercion, proportionality  does more than alternative methods to make judges treat the 
parties with respect. 
 We can now place the three constitutional styles along a spectrum. The Doric style 
reserves the stamp of objectivity for a judicial standpoint that transcends the “subjective” 
perspectives of the participants. The Ionic denies the possibility  of objectivity altogether, 
which it understands as requiring “an authoritative basis or foundation beyond current 
human choices.”99 By contrast, the Corinthian style constructs the judicial standpoint to 
incorporate a plurality  of perspectives of claimants and acknowledges the objectivity of 
their claims leading up to and including the moment of decision.100 The last section takes 
a closer look at how different constitutional methods articulate the positional objectivity 
of the judge. 
§6. Freedom and Imagination: The Critique of (Constitutional) Judgment  
“Being seen and being heard by others derive their significance from the fact that everybody 
sees and hears from a different position. This is the meaning of public life... The end of the 
98 See supra note. 
99 See Martha Minow, supra note 50 (Interpreting Rights), at 1877 (italics added)
100  As Hannah Arendt wrote referring to judgment in general, “impartiality is obtained by taking the 
standpoints of others into account: impartiality is not the result of some higher standpoint that would then 
settle the dispute by being above the melee.” Hannah Arendt, supra note 70 (Lectures on Kant’s Political 
Philosophy ), at 42.
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common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present 
itself in only one perspective.”
                   Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition101
        Public life requires citizens to bridge the abysses that separate them and experience 
the world from the perspectives of others. Because we cannot visit other people’s 
standpoints in reality, we must do it in thought. Imagination plays a crucial role. When 
one “tries to imagine what it  would be like to be somewhere else in thought,” one 
becomes “liberated from one’s own private interests” and “one’s judgment is no longer 
subjective.”102  The power of imagination thus becomes the precondition of our 
enlightenment.103  Imagining the world from other people’s perspectives – that  is, 
imagining the people we have not become – unveils dimensions of one’s own identity 
that routine and thoughtlessness would otherwise have continued to conceal. Only  the 
person that has trained his imagination “to go visiting”104  and discover the vastness of 
social space can be trusted to be free.
 Yet, imagining other people is difficult. We can hardly  imagine what it is like to 
be the people we know and love, much less a stranger, a political opponent or an 
adversary  in the courtroom. Reliance on imagination as a guarantor of political generosity 
is a dangerous gambit.105 Why then would such reliance in the context of constitutional 
methodology be any different?  
 I will not answer here the question why. My aim is solely  to study the forms that 
reliance might take. To this end, I look at  the role that imagination plays in each 
constitutional style and discuss what value, if any, the focus on imagination adds to 
101 Arendt, The Human Condition (1958), at 57-58.
102 Arendt, Lectures on Kant, 105-106.
103  See generally Paulo Barrozo, Law as Moral Imagination: The Great Alliance and the Future of Law 
(unpublished dissertation, Harvard University, 2009) (on file with Harvard Law Library). 
104 Arendt, Lectures on Kant, at 43.
105  Elaine Scarry,  The Difficulty of Imagining Other People, in Martha Nussbaum, For Love of Country? 
98-110 (2002).
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understanding constitutional methodology. Since constitutional judgment is a subspecies 
of judgment in general, I use the works of Kant and Arendt as helpful guides.  
Like Kant’s transcendent idealism, the Doric style enlarges the judicial 
perspective by detaching the judge from contingent particulars – including his own – to a 
universal position from which independent judgment is possible. Kant wrote: “However 
small the range and degree to which a man’s natural endowments extend, it still indicates 
a man of enlarged mind: if he detaches himself from the subjective personal conditions of 
his judgment, which cramp the minds of so many others, and reflects upon his own 
judgment from a universal standpoint (which can be done by shifting (one’s) ground to 
the standpoint of others).”106  The objectivity and impartiality of the Doric judicial 
standpoint are functions of the judge’s capacity to transcend the perspectives of the 
claimants. But before transcending, the judge must imagine the position of the claimants 
– he must represent them. Representation is an essential faculty of constitutional 
judgment: the judge bridges “the abysses of remoteness that separate him from the parties 
by representing them.”107
The process of representation-imagination is scripted. The script – namely, 
judicial method – has the role of filtering out elements of the context whose relevance 
law does not recognize. And Doric law does not recognize most elements of context. 
Legal form de-robes people of their contingencies; as Elaine Scarry’s nicely put it, 
“constitutional strategies rely  on a strategy of imagined weightlessness, since they  define 
rights and powers that are independent of any person’s personal features.”108 
Access to the universal standpoint requires detachment from the particulars of 
context and thinking in the place of “any other man.”109  Presumably, this task is not 
106 Kant, The Critique of Judgment, at 153
107 Emphasis on representation of others in judicial reasoning,  in the best understanding of the Doric or any 
of the other styles, is not meant to replace or supplement political representation. The disreputable history 
of such an approach is told in Martti Koskenniemi, Legal Cosmopolitanism: Tom Franck's Messianic 
World, 35 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 471 (2003).
108 Elaine Scarry, supra note 105 (The Difficulty of Imagining Other People), at 106 (my italics). 
109 Id. 
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peculiar to judges only. Since representation is not a one-way street, the parties too must 
imagine themselves in the standpoint of their judges.110 They must make the effort to see 
whether the judgment by which they are required to abide is the same as the judgment 
they  would have reached if they themselves had been in the position of the decision-
maker. The burden of representing the standpoint of judges is significant. It  requires 
parties to bracket away the need to satisfy the interests that brought them to court in the 
first place. That position places the claimants behind a veil of ignorance where awareness 
of their positions and the certainty  of their own rightness no longer shape their 
perspective.111  This cognitive ability  to grasp the mutability  of social roles by learning 
how to detach oneself from the contingencies of one’s own social position is a defining 
characteristic of a Doric constitutional culture. There are far-reaching consequences for a 
political culture when citizens come to understand their social roles as being the result of 
fortune as much as of virtue or vice. It is a failure only  of imagination, and not of 
possibility, if one cannot conceive of one’s life taking a different turn in “the yellow 
wood.”112 
Critics of the Doric approach have questioned that style’s imperative of 
detachment. In this view, the impossibility  of transcending all formative contexts that 
shape one’s perception of the world is only  compounded by a mindset of striving towards 
the universal standpoint. That mindset breeds estrangement and alienation from the 
political and social world. As we saw in the previous section, the Ionic style offers 
situatedness as an alternative to detachment. Judges immerse themselves in the positions 
of the parties and experience the controversy  in its fullness from their perspective. This 
110  They must do so as part of their duties of citizenship. For the idea of citizens as office-holders, see 
Rawls, Political Liberalism, at___. 
111  See Koskeniemmi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, at 501 (“formalism seeks to persuade the 
protagonists (lawyers, decisionmakers) to take a momentary distance from their preferences and to enter a 
terrain where these preferences should be justified, instead of taken for granted, by reference to standards 
that are independent from their particular positions or interests.)
112   Robert Frost, The Road Not Taken in Selected Early Poems 141 (Thomas Fasano ed., Coyote Canyon 
Press)(2008).
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constitutional space is hyper-relativized: from each standpoint the landscape looks 
different. The Ionic style conceptualizes responsiveness not as transcendence of 
particulars but as empathy with the particulars. The other is represented empathetically, 
and empathy is the process by which the decision-maker immerses himself into the 
standpoint of the parties. 
One critique of empathy targets its inherent instability. When conducted properly, 
empathy runs the risk of blurring the lines between oneself and others.113 The discovery of 
humanity in others ultimately  threatens to transgress the boundaries of our inherent 
separations. For this reason empathy  can be considered “assimilationist.”114  Its object 
assimilates it. The one who loses himself in another cannot be said to remain situated 
anywhere: he is always at the mercy of his object of attention. If the Doric approach 
positions judges in ways that  are too aloof and distant, the Ionic correction errs in the 
opposite direction: the judicial standpoint melts under the heat of empathy. This is no 
doubt a rather drastic approach to the mutability of institutional roles. 
This critique is only partly  sound. The risk that  the empathetic self can become 
entirely  assimilated to its object is exaggerated.115  For the same reason why Doric 
transcendence cannot shake off its formative contexts before setting out to judge, so here 
the immersion into another person’s perspective does not wipe out all previous traces of 
one’s own personality. But it is true that the Ionic style lacks a synthesis formula, so to 
speak, to show how the judicial standpoint grows and expands as its object of empathy 
keeps shifting from one object to the next. Without such a formula, the judge runs the 
113  For example, see Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our 
Judges, 61 S. Cal.  L. Rev. 1877, 1935 (1988) (“Rather than bemoan ... a switch in roles, feminism teaches 
us to celebrate such rearrangements, to require judges to let others judge them. Such moments might better 
enable judges to be empathetic, to adopt the perspective of the other, to enter into the experience of the 
courtroom unprotected by their special status. Judge as witness can thus be understood as a profound 
challenge to a stable hierarchy, as a subversive act to be applauded.”) 
114 See supra note. 
115  See Robin West, The Anti-Empathic Turn (2011), available at (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.  cfm?
abstract_id=1885079). On empathy generally, see Karsten Steuber, Rediscovering Empathy (2006). 
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very real risk of becoming assimilated – or “locked,” as Kant put it  116  – into other 
people’s prejudices and biases. Without critical distance and a method, an adjudicator 
might end up trading one set of prejudices for another.117
But there is another and greater difficulty with Ionic empathy, and it has to do 
with the fact of pluralism. While this style embraces (indeed, extolls) pluralism, it also 
tends to miscalculate its depth. Its friendly attitude results from the questionable belief 
that distances between people are shorter than they appear. One can of course find 
evidence to the contrary, and the very line that separates reasonable from unreasonable 
conceptions of the good is itself the object of (reasonable) dispute. But whatever the truth 
of the matter is, it might still be prudent to select  a judicial method on the premise that 
the distance between the members of a political community  is considerable. The need for 
a judicial mind that does not just travel but can also synthesize the resulting information 
is paramount to then applying constitutional law in a way that coordinates social 
interaction. Synthesis of that sort requires detachment to an impartial – that  is, objective – 
judicial standpoint.  
 Like all legal judgments, constitutional judgment must be impartial. Impartiality 
reflects the decision makers’ distance from any claimants’ private interests: the judge 
should speak from the perspective of the citizenry  and its laws.118  The Corinthian style 
seeks to construct an empathetic yet impartial judicial standpoint somewhere in the 
116 Kant, Critique of Judgment, at 160.
117 See Disch, 162 (discussing the risks of shifting “(others’) prejudices for the prejudices proper to (one’s) 
own station.”). It can be said, with respect to proportionality analysis, that the division into four distinct 
steps imposes a “mental double-check” aimed precisely at creating the distance necessary to identify and 
counter possible prejudice. For a discussion of mental double-checks and the psychology of judging, see 
Dan H. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe?  Scott v. 
Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837 (2009).
118  Judicial decisions, like all acts of state authority, are coercive acts.  And “any coercive act in a liberal 
democracy has to be conceivable as a collective judgment of reason about what justice and good policy 
require.” See Mattias Kumm, The Idea of Socratic Contestation and the Right to Justification: The Point of 
Rights-Based Proportionality Review, Law and Ethics of Human Rights vol. 4(2): 141-157 (2010), at 157. 
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“middle ground between cognitive truth claims and mere subjective preferences.”119  We 
have already seen why and how it goes about doing it, and have reflected on its limited 
success.  
  Arendt’s work on the critique of judgment eloquently  captures the task of the 
Corinthian style. Arendt famously framed this analysis as an explanation of Kant’s 
Lectures on Political Philosophy. Commentators have noted that there is more Arendt 
than Kant in those explanations. 120  Yet, it is telling that Arendt herself did not see it that 
way. I believe the reason is that she saw her interpretation as solving the instability 
inherent in the concept of representation in the only way it can be solved, hence Kant’s 
only possible implied solution. The instability  has to do with how much detachment 
judgment requires. As one commentator formulates the problem, “representation is 
principally oriented toward creating distance. It detaches me from the immediacy of the 
present where there is no space in which to stop  and think. Representation is a limited 
withdrawal that makes the present less urgent and the familiar strange but stops sort of 
disengaging me to the point that I no longer care to wonder what a situation means.”121 
Now, the problem is the same we have encountered in the discussion between Doric 
universalism and Ionic particularism.  
 Arendt’s way out is to emphasize plurality as an alternative. She starts by  
rejecting approaches similar to what I labeled as the Doric approach: “[I]mpartiality is 
obtained by taking the standpoints of others into account: impartiality is not the result of 
some higher standpoint that would then settle the dispute by  being above the melee.”122 
By the same token, the process of representation “does not blindly adopt the actual views 
119 Nedelsky cited in Salyzyn, The Role of Agency in Arendt’s Theory of Judgment: A Principled Approach 
to Diversity on the Bench, 3 J. L. & Equal. 165 (2004) at 174.
120 Amy Salyzyn, The Role of Agency in Arendt’s Theory of Judgment: A Principled Approach to Diversity 
on the Bench, 3 J.  L. & Equal. 165 (2004) --- at 169 (“while she seeks to appropriate many of the core 
concepts of Kant’s theory, she rejects his transcendental universalism and moves away from his formalism 
to situate judgments in real, particular communities.”)
121 Disch Hannah Arendt and the Limits of Philosophy, at 158
122 Arendt, Lectures on Kant, at 42. 
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of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different 
perspective: this is a question…of empathy.”123  As one of Arendt’s commentators put it, 
empathy requires to “‘be or to feel like somebody  else,’ while in representation – of the 
kind that Arendt has in mind – visiting is hypothetically to think and to feel as myself in a 
different position.”124  Rather, the standpoint gives the judge sufficient distance from a 
controversy  to gain the perspective on which impartiality depends but not so much as to 
become disconnected and aloof. 125
 The situated impartiality of the (Corinthian) judicial standpoint, as Arendt 
describes the standpoint of judgment generally, is the outcome of “a critical decision that 
is not justified with reference to an abstract standard of right  but by visiting a plurality  of 
diverging public standpoints.”126  In this relational constitutional space, moving back and 
forth enlarges the judicial standpoint  by integrating different perspectives. And that 
integration of the different perspectives within the judicial standpoint – as constitutional 
interpretations whose objectivity is undisputed – enhances the perception of judicial 
responsiveness. 
123 Arendt, Lectures on Kant, Interpretative essay, at 107.
124 Disch at 168
125  Arendt,  On the nature of totalitarianism: An Essay in Understanding (quoted in Lisa Disch,  Hannah 
Arendt and the Limits of Philosophy, at 157) (“Only imagination is capable of what we know as “putting 
things in their proper distance” and which actually means that we should be strong enough to remove those 
which are too close until we can see and understand them without bias and prejudice, strong enough to 
bridge the abysses of remoteness until we can see and understand those that are too far away as though they 
were our own affairs.  This removing some things and bridging the abysses to others is part of the 
interminable dialogue for whose purpose direct experience establishes too immediate and too close a 
contact and mere knowledge erects an artificial barrier.”)
126  Disch (162). Arendt goes on. As she describes it: “I form an opinion by considering a given issue from 
different viewpoints, by making present in my mind the standpoints of those who are absent: I represent 
them. …The more people’s standpoints I have present in my mind while I am pondering a given issue, and 
the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity 
for representative thinking and valid my final conclusions, my opinions.” Arendt, Lectures on Kant, 
Interpretative essay, at 107.
40 40
The presence of social pluralism in the form of a plurality  of standpoints in 
constitutional methodology is a defining feature of proportionality. At one level, this 
development is unnerving. The purpose of law is to solve disagreement, not replicate 
it.127 However, the success of proportionality also shows that legal doctrine and method 
need not necessarily  implode under the pressure of multiple standpoints. Exactly why not 
is a different matter that I cannot explore here. But pursuing this line of inquiry, that is, 
understanding how and why in some legal practices the judicial standpoint can 
incorporate multiple perspectives, might help explain why proportionality  continues to be 
resisted in American constitutional law. That answer will probably  include reference to 
the “integrity-anxiety” of the choice of the constitutional methodology that can help the 
legal system perform its socially stabilizing function under the constant pressures of 
political polarization.128
Conclusion
The relation between proportionality and freedom is complex. In this paper I have 
suggested that the main source of proportionality’ appeal is its promise of enhancing 
judicial responsiveness. I have also argued that proportionality does not entirely delivers 
on that promise since its judicial technique is not, at least in its current forms, able to 
synthesize properly the twin needs for the universality of form and the particularity of 
context. Nevertheless, a study of proportionality offers a glimpse at  where constitutional 
practice and theory are today and where they might be headed in the future. 
127 Jeremy Waldron, Kant’s Legal Positivism, 1535 Harvard Law Review 1535, 1540 (1996) (“law must be 
such that its content and validity can be determined without reproducing the disagreements about rights and 
justice that it is law’s function to supersede.”)
128 This argument has been made in the related context of the American rejection of the use of foreign law 
in constitutional interpretation. See Frank Michelman, Integrity-Anxiety?, in Michael Ignatieff (ed.), 
American Exceptionalism and Human Rights (2005). 
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  That future is fraught with dangers and opportunity. The need for internal stability 
and consistency can take proportionality in the direction of ever-greater reliance on 
expertise and an aseptic formalization of legal reasons. This development, whose signs 
are already present in contemporary constitutional practice, would turn the method into a 
powerful tool for the “administratization” of constitutional law129, thus squaring the circle 
of its nineteenth century origins and the widespread colonization of the legal imagination 
two centuries later. It  would take another paper to argue why such development ought to 
be resisted. For now, it suffices to say  that, in my view, this development would 
impoverish constitutional discourse and leave contemporary constitutional democracies 
without an essential forum which, for all its flaws and insufficiencies, still enables 
citizens to reflect, albeit in a stylized form, on the terms of their collective self-
government. 130  Conversely, attention to proportionality understood as conceptualized in 
this paper can channel the considerable resources of constitutional thought in a more 
fruitful direction of synthesizing the universal and the particular, form and context - the 
deep  forces that shape contemporary  constitutional doctrine and theory. The stakes in that 
project are high, perhaps as high as the very fate of constitutional democracy in many 
parts of the world. 
129 For such an argument, see Moshe Cohen-Eliya and Iddo Porat, supra note 8, at 487-490. 
130 Reflecting on the public space of politics, Arendt wrote that “Whenever people come together, the world 
thrusts itself between them, and it is in this in-between space that all human affairs are conducted”, in 
Hannah Arendt, Introduction into Politics in The Promise of Politics 106 (Jerome Kohn ed., 2005).
